This article compares and explores forms of 'public' participation in the development of bioethical governance of human embryonic stem cell research (hESR) in four Asian societies, and in doing so it contributes to the wider discussions on expertise and public inclusion. The article aims to add nuance to the concept of 'public consultation' by focusing on the contested meanings and relationships through which public roles and public debates are defined. The analysis seeks to go beyond a straightforward comparison by interpreting public discussions of hESR as being influenced by both local conditions and interconnected global science institutions. An adequate understanding of the public participation in debates on science requires the analysis of (a) particular reasons for scientific issues to require public discussion; (b) pressures of transnational forces; (c) variability of publics relevant to bioethical regulation; and, (d) the effects of institutionalization of bioethics. This study uses data from fieldwork conducted between 2006 and 2010 in four Asian countries. Most of the interviews were conducted in the local languages and concerned various kinds of public participation in bioethics activities, as well as the views of stem cell scientists on the need to involve the public in discussions on the acceptability of their research.
The notion that the public should participate in discussions on controversial forms of science gained currency in the 1960s and 1970s. Various authors have emphasized that in democratic countries a point is made of including the public in debates on scientific issues (Collins and Evans, 2002; Evans and Plows, 2007; de Vries, 2007; Irwin, 2001; Jasanoff, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2010) . This notion seems to underline the idea that participation in scientific debates is a matter of 'being democratic'. A discussion of such issues in East Asia puts this notion of public engagement in perspective, and yields insight into the reasons why certain forms of scientific research become controversial in the first place. To observers of science and society, it is unclear why scientists, politicians or members of the public in different countries ring the alarm bell that marks scientific practices as unethical, risky or illegal, and what political and public mechanisms are in place for them to discuss this.
This article compares modes of public participation in discussions on human embryonic stem cell research (hESR) in East Asia; discussions that are often held to be absent or low-key in this region (Kato, 2005; Sleeboom-Faulkner 2008a,b) . One aim of this paper is to add nuance to this view by examining forms of public participation in bioethics discussions in East Asia, and the political underpinning of those discussions. The politics of public discussion is closely related to the question of why science becomes controversial. This is so particularly for some countries where there is a trend of adopting regulatory institutions from abroad, including bioethical guidelines. Transnational pressure has rarely been taken into account in discussions of expertise and public inclusion. Increased international science collaboration, global competition and the tightening of ethics review criteria for publications have become transnational driving forces behind the adoption of the regulation of science; this influence is stronger in some countries than in others. The question arises, what happens to public debate when existing debate is largely aimed at an audience of global scientists? A second aim of this paper, then, is to discuss the implications of the diversity of audiences, including global audiences, for 'local' public discussion.
Related to this, we might ask why particular forms of science and technology become contentious among only some national audiences, why some governments still invite public discussion even when science practices are not controversial, and why, even when they feel they have little or no influence, the public in some nations participates in such debates. Some academic discussions on expertise seem to proceed from the idea that the public demands to be included in decision-making. In the case of genomics and hESR, however, the state and particular groups of scientists have initiated bioethics discussions and framed the issues themselves. A third aim here, then, is to examine the varying driving forces behind the inclusion of the views of 'the people' in the discussion, and the extent of its reach.
With global demands for institutional review, the need has grown for personnel working in hESR to have sufficient 'interactional expertise' (Collins and Evans, 2002) to be able to communicate about bioethics with both scientists and government institutions. But the idea that the institutionalization of ethics review through regulation and ethics committees in Western democracies can replace broad public engagement, we show, should be scrutinized, even when the public does not seem to be aware of, or interested in, controversial issues. A fourth aim of this paper, then, is to illustrate how the institutionalization of bioethics may encourage bureaucratization and lead to a decrease in public engagement.
Participatory forms of debate can cover various forms of bioethics activism, including public lectures, public events, the publication of pamphility and briefings, meetings among religious communities, women's movements and disability movements, web activism and contacts with the press (Bucchi and Neresini, 2007) . Crucially, the particular forms of bioethics governance that countries adopt show diversity in the way states adopt public views in research regulation. The notions of democratic (or bottom-up) and autocratic (or top-down) organization, which are often contrasted and discussed for their merits and demerits (Ockwell et al., 2009; Meslin, 2010; Sabatier, 1986) , may be too blunt to improve the understanding of the great diversity in forms of public engagement. The fifth aim of this paper, therefore, is not to indicate whether public engagement is orchestrated autocratically or generated by 'ordinary' members of the population, but to show how science and society are co-produced with particular participatory and governance mechanisms. Such co-production needs to be understood through both national and global frames. The final, related, aim here is to show that the co-production of participatory and governance mechanisms at a national level is to a varying extent subject to global change.
Method
This study set out to examine the role of public engagement in bioethics decision-making in four different countries in order to give a more nuanced perspective on the traditional contrast between democratic, bottom-up and autocratic, top-down approaches. By observing forms of discussions -their initiators and organizers, and their effect on the evolution of regulation on a national level and in an international context -we hoped to gain a deeper understanding of the interaction between global influences and local forms of debate on the bioethics regulation of hESR.
By selecting the four East Asian societies for this study, we expected to shed significant light on public involvement in bioethics, if only for their different modes of political organization: Japan as a parliamentary democracy with a strong bureaucratic apparatus and industry; South Korea as a young democratic society retaining a strong sociopolitical notion of hierarchy; Taiwan as a young democracy largely occupied with its political identity vis-a-vis Mainland China; and Mainland China as a society that officially advertises its political organization as 'socialist with Chinese characteristics'.
Data used in this study result from fieldwork conducted intermittently in Taiwan, Mainland China and Japan from June 2006 until May 2010 by the first author, and in South Korea from October 2008 until December 2009 by the second author. The research is based on a literature review of relevant publications and reports for all four societies, and interviews with a number of scientists and other bioethics expert groups (106) or civic activists (44) in South Korea (14; 20) , Japan (46; 10) Mainland China (42; 6) and Taiwan (4; 8) . 1 In addition, short periods of participant observation in laboratories in Mainland China (2), Japan (2) and Taiwan (1), varying from 3 days to 1 week, were also conducted. The laboratory visits enabled the authors to organize discussions among laboratory personnel and yielded insight into what issues were sensitive regarding public discussion and hESR, and which questions would be useful to ask in interviews. Further data were garnered from the analysis of medical textbooks in Mainland China. Published by academic publishers and produced by specialists in philosophy, medicine and, increasingly, bioethics, such textbooks are mainly directed at medical students and give an overview of developments in bioethics in Mainland China. Following this introduction, we then discuss the national and global framings of bioethics discussion, contextualizing the driving forces for public involvement in bioethics regulation in East Asian Countries. Following that section, we go on to illustrate diverging forms of bioethics activities in the four East Asian societies, revealing the multiple meanings of public engagement. We then discuss theoretical notions of public engagement in science debate, and analyse the social politics behind bioethics activities in East Asia in light of national and global developments in the life sciences. In the final section, on the basis of this study of bioethics regulation in the four East Asian societies, we illustrate how the kinds of publics involved in bioethics are crucial to the 'object of research ' (De Vries, 2007) .
National and global framings of bioethics discussion
The controversy over the 'third wave' of Science and Technology Studies has been framed in terms of the extent to which the public should be included in discussions of scientific development (Collins and Evans, 2002; Jasanoff, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2010; Wynne, 2003) . We believe that a normative discussion about who should be included in debates on bioethics is best preceded by an understanding of what public participation means in the political and cultural context of the locality in which it takes place. Apart from the political nature of the national framing of the discussion (Jasanoff, 2005) , we need to understand the particular socio-cultural history of science decision-making and the mechanisms by which issues are defined as problems requiring public attention.
The term 'public discussion', for example, translates as 'national discussion' in Asian languages. Thus, Japan refers to it as 'kokumin tooron' and in China 'guomin taolun', notions that, unlike 'public debate', do not presume that public scrutiny is necessary to protect citizens from undesired state intervention or state policies. 'National discussion', then, provides the government with an idea of problems related to innovation, and is used to strengthen state policies. This does not, however, mean that the views of stakeholders and minorities are not taken seriously. But the global nature of competition and collaboration in the life sciences, including hESR, means that countries that do not dominate the international playing field of the life sciences find themselves importing, and adapting to, scientific institutions, including bioethical institutions, that are prevalent elsewhere. The question is how the institutionalization of bioethics proceeds in such cases, and how it affects the meaning of 'bioethics' for those involved and affected by hESR.
Competition with colleagues in the international intellectual field (Bourdieu, 1969 ) requires scientists to be globally aware, not only of developments in the life sciences, but also of the means available to their competitors, the funding and research facilities they enjoy, and the regulatory environments in which they work. Researchers who have undertaken their higher education abroad often become keenly aware of the differences between the organizational and material set-up of science in their host country and that of their alma mater at home (Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2010a; Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra, 2011) . This global awareness enables them to plan collaborations, publications and biomaterial exchanges, and to compete with other laboratories at home. All this requires the overt observation of minimal international standards, such as those set by the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) (Daley et al., 2007) . Bioethics regulation of hESR, then, is not just relevant to 'local' taxpayers, and to local ethical and political debates at home. Debate and regulation in other countries become crucial also to the decisions scientists make about whom to collaborate with, and to the 'ethical' decisions that international users and consumers make on buying stem cell products. Furthermore, local regulation is important to the international stem cell research community, as this community does not want stem cell science to be tainted by 'rogue' researchers. Scientists in East Asia are conscious of the need to adopt what they regard as 'Western' rules, which are thought to be the source of protests by local pressure groups. The loss of reputation of South Korean stem cell science in 2005 (Song, 2006) has re-emphasized among East Asian stem cell scientists the fragility and importance of reputation, and the connectivity between international regulatory trends and local regulation and laboratory practices. Public discussion, then, is framed by multiple audiences not confined to national boundaries.
Public engagement and bioethics in East Asia
The institutionalization of bioethics discourse has taken different routes in European countries (Jasanoff, 2005) , where both official and non-official groups have played diverging roles. Developments in bioethics in Asia vary, too, and official parties (government, regulators), science experts, experts in bioethics and the broader public have taken part as well. Though it seems obvious that bioethics governance evolves through the co-construction of developments in science, technology and society, it is less clear how scientists, policy-makers and the public interact, and to what effect. As shown below, some perspectives emphasize that regulating science and technology serves the pursuit of knowledge (and, indirectly, society and progress) ; others emphasize that the resultant scientific knowledge can serve society only when it is based on democratically negotiated ethics guidelines; and still others maintain that tissue collection should guarantee that the resultant benefits are 'given back' to the community in terms of, say, healthcare and education. The examples presented below serve to illustrate alternative forms of public engagement in the bioethics governance of hESR in East Asia.
South Korea
Since the late 1990s, South Korea has actively promoted the life sciences, in particular stem cell research. Although the development of formal bioethics in South Korea is organized hierarchically, it evolved through activities and notions developed by civic groups and non-governmental organisation (NGOs). As in other countries, this participatory form of creating regulation has gradually led to the absorption of civic players into government-led processes of constructing regulation, through the professionalization of bioethics. Specific to South Korea, however, is the initial strong impetus of civic groups in organizing bioethics activities.
In South Korea, bioethics legislation in the late 1990s began in the restricted domain of parliamentary discourse. As in other countries, bioethics expertise was only just emerging, and its authority was rarely recognized at that time. Consequently, the Korean establishment of bioethics governance should be characterized as a top-down approach. As was the case in Mainland China and Taiwan, South Korean society had only just undergone radical reforms. In the 1990s, when South Korea changed politically from a dictatorship to a democratic state, scientific experts and civic organizations increasingly expressed views about political and social issues (Bak, 2007; Park, 2006) . This was also the case when, following the birth of Dolly the sheep in 1997 and the derivation of hES cells in 1998, South Korea took steps towards the regulation of bioethics governance. When ethical controversy ensued, members of religious groups and environmental NGOs began to call for setting up a national bioethics committee. But until 2000, the scope of participation was restricted to individual assemblymen and their scientific advisors (Kim, 2004) . This meant that bills proposed by the National Assembly were aimed primarily at facilitating biotechnological development, and the only bioethical regulation concerned the prohibition of human cloning.
The influential NGOs included feminist and environmentalist groups. In 1997, the Centre for Democracy in Science and Technology (CDST) was set up by civilians concerned about the role of science and technology in Korean society (Centre for Democracy in Science and Technology, 1999) . It played an important role in propagating the need for discussion about bioethical issues. It was instrumental, for example, in creating the Alliance for Biosafety and Bioethics (ABB) in 1998, and played a significant role in the 2001 'Urgent Cooperation Campaign for Bioethics Legislation'. The CDST exerted much influence on the development of bioethics in South Korea by mobilizing largescale campaigns through alliances with NGOs, religious groups and a handful of experts. It also sought democratic forms of public engagement, and helped organize consensus conferences in cooperation with UNESCO on various themes, including genetically modified organism (GMO) food, human cloning and nuclear power. The CDST also proposed (in the form of a petition in 2000) the Bioscience, Human Rights and Ethics Bill as an alternative to previous regulatory bills. Starting in the year 2000, when media reports appeared on the derivation of stem cells from in vitro fertilisation (IVF) embryos and therapeutic cloning, calls for regulation from NGOs and the Roman Catholic Church became louder. The legislation on bioethics became a turf war between pro-regulatory groups and pro-research groups, and between the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), which represented the respective groups' interests. An inter-ministerial office, the Bioethics Advisory Committee, was established to initiate coordinating discussions. The establishment of this committee, composed of 20 members, including humanities scholars, NGO representatives, biotechnology professors, a Catholic priest and medical doctors, led to the establishment in 2000 (under the MoST) of the National Bioethics Association (NBA). The NBA included social scientists, NGOs, religious leaders, bioscientists and medical scientists, and it largely created the basic framework for the Bioethics Law in May 2001. But once bioethics concerns became official political issues, they attracted public interest and led to conflict and the polarization of views between what were portrayed by the press as 'science' and 'ethics' supporters.
A notable conflict developed between the Catholic Church, which opposed therapeutic cloning and embryo research, and scientists, who criticized any obstruction to embryo research. The strong reaction of scientists led MoST to declare that the NBA's position did not represent the official stance. Subsequent conflicts were framed in the mainstream media, often typified as 'scientific advance fettered by ethics' (Kim, 2004) . The success earned by stem cell scientist Hwang Woo-Suk and his team, together with the national funding bestowed upon him with great fanfare, augmented the growing patriotic and optimistic atmosphere among the public, culminating in his international publication successes in 2004 and 2005. In 2005 the Bioethics Biosafety Act created more stringent conditions for somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) research, but Hwang Woo-Suk was able to take advantage of interim measures to apply for research permission for patientspecific embryo cloning. Nevertheless, critical voices were not completely absent, even before the 'Hwang scandal' shook the science community in 2005. For example, the Korean Bioethics Association demanded that Hwang's team respond to suspicions expressed about the researchers' integrity, including the source of oocytes and the oversight by their institutional review board (IRB) (Korean Bioethics Association, 2004) . In 2005, Hwang was openly accused of fabricating scientific data and obtaining oocytes from female laboratory researchers.
But it was the revelation that Hwang's publications were based on faked data, rather than the bioethical problems associated with the sourcing of oocytes, that lost him most of his public support and research funding (Kim, 2008b) . Although the role of civic players in the development of regulation had been considerable, new regulation was now built on a more formal bioethical basis. Thus, the 2008 amendment of the Bioethics and Biosafety Act was aimed at bureaucratic oversight and control of research. But criticism continued, with a focus on clearing up the inconsistencies and deficiencies in oversight policies directly concerned with the Hwang scandal. For example, rules were specified for allowing the donation of eggs for stem cell research, but they did not need to be met in the case of egg donation for infertility treatment. Now that bioethics had acquired international prestige and had become a requirement for international high-quality science publications and international collaborations, bioethics regulation became a matter of top-down implementation. In short, due to international incentives, bioethics activism underwent professionalization and became established within the academic community. This changed power configuration meant that grassroots campaigners such as CDST could no longer play a role in public discussion by forming alliances with concerned scientists. Although the extent of the role of these civic players is hard to measure, and although it has been argued that their effect on science regulation, especially since 2009, has been minimal (Kim, 2008a) , earlier developments described above show that in South Korea great effort has been exerted by civic campaigners to pressure official parties to engage the public in a democratic manner.
Scientists who were initially active in social movements eventually became isolated or were drawn into formal governance. Despite the fact that the role of scientists in the public debate was substantial during the process of bioethical legislation, in the aftermath of the Hwang Woo-Suk scandal the Korean scientific community was heavily criticized for its lack of self-discipline. Stem cell researchers preferred soft guidelines rather than a legal framework for bioethical regulation, but they increasingly accepted that the stricter policy approach adopted after the Hwang scandal was inevitable in order to restore public confidence in the governance of stem cell research. In terms of their notions of public discussion of ethical issues, scientists regarded more accurate, sciencebased communication as necessary for moving away from either 'blind' support for, or objections to, stem cell research.
Japan
The case of Japan illustrates how civic players can have crucial influence on research regulation, even in the absence of broad public debate. In Japan, unlike South Korea, a majority of interviewed scientists voiced the wish to stimulate public debate, and many have actually participated. Nevertheless, the notion of hESR, despite much effort to stimulate public debate, was little known among the general public, even after the outbreak of the Hwang Woo-Suk scandal. This seems to indicate little public concern with hESR in Japan. Minority voices among the public, however, were crucial for the creation of regulation and the development of hESR in Japan.
Bioethics in Japan developed under the influence of, and in reaction to, 1960s concepts of medical ethics in the USA. Although many scientists and bioethicists in Japan believe that Japan is not good at public discussion concerning bioethics issues, some heated debates on 'brain death' and 'euthanasia' took place in the 1980s and 1990s (Lock, 2000) . On 30 November 2000, Japan's Parliament enacted the Human Cloning Regulation Act, creating ample allowance for in vitro human embryo research, and in September 2001 the Koizumi government approved the use of embryonic stem (ES) cell lines for basic research. But officials worried whether these acts reflected public sentiment and whether sufficient public discussion had preceded the legislation. Thus, the government made substantial investments in bioethics institutions and human capacity building, in order to raise awareness and encourage public engagement (Kayukawa, 2003; Morioka, 2006; Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2010b) . Nevertheless, only a few civic voices in Japan responded to these efforts (Kato, 2005) .
In 2002, the government began organizing the national debate (kokuminteki riron) on hESR, and endeavoured to make the public aware of problems related to embryo and oocyte donation, as well as the status of the embryo and its handling. These efforts were partly delegated to scientists, who started to lecture in community centres and science cafes; meanwhile, in academia the discipline of science communication was developed and the discussion platform of 'Genomics Square' was initiated. According to science communication observer Kato Kazuto, also its organizer, the debate failed to generate nationwide discussion on hESR (Kato, 2005) . However, in some respects the debate was effective, as the views of several social groups in Japan were strongly represented, including some patient organizations (such as the Japan Spinal Injury Foundation (JSCF)), religious sects (such as the Buddhist Omoto and Seichoo no Ie sects), a women's movement (Sooshiren) and the Anti-Eugenics Network (an organization composed of strands of the women's movement and various organizations for disabled people) (Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2008b (SleeboomFaulkner, 2008b) .
Despite the low-key debate, the criticism of minority voices had translated into a strictly implemented set of regulations that led to dissatisfaction among scientists involved in hESR. With the issue in 2001 of the Guidelines for Derivation and Utilisation of Human Embryonic Stem Cells by three ministries, 2 Japan officially permitted research on human ES cells. But the implementation of regulations was not straightforward. Although it allowed for the destruction of embryos, in a separate clause of the regulation, it emphasized respect for stem cells and the embryo as the 'sprout of human life', in addition to requiring informed consent from donors, and the possibility of withdrawal of consent (Ida, 2002) . Strict rules were in place for obtaining permission to establish human stem cell lines: hES cell lines had to be kept separately from other kinds of cell lines; stem cell researchers were required to attend courses on bioethics; and they were expected to show respect for the embryos and embryonic cell lines (Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2010b) . In practice, stem cell scientists whom we interviewed translated such respect variously as 'being grateful to the donors', 'thinking of its original potential to generate one more individual', 'being careful not to waste it' and 'make sure it is not mislaid' (interviews with Yamagata, Sawa, 8 May 2006; Nishihara, 26 May 2006; Mitsui, 10 April 2006) .
In a next step on the road to biotech regulation, on 23 June 2004 Japan's highestranking organization for science and technology policy-making, the CSTP, opened the door to therapeutic cloning. Shortly thereafter, on 1 July 2004, the health ministry's ethics committee voted unanimously to allow the use of stem cells from aborted fetuses in clinical research (Cyranoski, 2005) . As a result, regulation for the handling of embryos and the clinical application of stem cells had to be developed. But by 2007, largely due to scandals associated with embryos that had been found in the garbage of Yokohama City Hospital (Yokohama Shinai Byooin) in 2004 and the subsequent survey among hospitals that revealed similar cases, it had proven impossible for the committee led by Nakahata Shiratori to include hESR in the regulation for Stem Cell Research in a Clinical Setting (August 2007) (interview, Nakahata, 28 May 2007). The separate regulation for research aimed at the application of human embryonic stem cells (hES cells), established in May 2006, permitted therapeutic cloning only if the bioethical risks relating to oocyte donation were contained and a solid scientific basis was established through animal experimentation using primates. Scientists then complained that strict regulation had brought the development of hESR in Japan to a halt (Cyranoski, 2005; Nakatsuji, 2007; Slingby et al., 2004) . Fears arose that tight regulation would similarly slow down induced pluripotent stem cell (iPS) research, first developed by Japanese stem cell scientist Yamanaka, and that American competition working in private laboratories in California, uninhibited by stringent research regulation, would overtake Japan. When these fears became a major issue in the media, the regulation for the use of hES cells was slightly loosened. However, the regulation for oocyte donation was still so tight that the likelihood that applications for SCNT would be initiated were considered to be extremely small (interview, Nakayama, 3 December 2008) .
The comparatively strict regulation may have made scientists impatient. But scientists in Japan, in contrast with most scientists interviewed in Mainland China, did not want to press their cause. This, it was feared, would lead to scandal and a loss of chances to gain research funding. Thus, in early 2007, the majority of the 52 Japanese scientists interviewed emphasized the need for public debate, and observed that the public had not shown much interest in involving itself in such debate (Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2008b , 2010b . Forty-nine scientists expressed their reasons for their desire to stimulate public debate in Japan, which cluster as:
• to make the public aware of the value of hESR for incurably ill people and for the elderly in an ageing society; • to enable people to understand the purpose of egg donation and embryo donation; • to make the public aware of the importance of research ethics to scientists as a first step in gaining the cooperation of the public; • to persuade people that the ethics of the research is sound, so that there would be no need for strict regulation of stem cell research.
These views should be understood in the institutional context in which bioethics has developed in Japan, which largely is ruled through social control and responsibilization (Rose, 2007) . In Japan, even though the regulation of hESR has been comparatively strict, most scientists supported encouraging public debate on it. But the public debate was only partly successful. Although the general public proved hard to mobilize in the debate, citizens groups responded and took the initiative to voice their views. At the same time, expert committees responded to the views of both scientists and civic groups, employing them in moulding the regulation of hESR. But, as also was the case to a certain extent in South Korea and Taiwan, activists remarked that participating in the debate was extremely hard for them. Unlike scientists, lawyers and politicians, they needed to invest their own time, money and efforts, without any of the advantages professionals tended to expect at the end of the journey, such as salary, funding, promotion, or work satisfaction (interview, Mitsubishi, 30 October 2008) . Therefore, though the professionalization of bioethics seemed to coexist with the voices of citizen groups, the personal and material dedication required of dissident activists rendered them ineffective compared with state-supported personnel taking the lead in formulating the issues.
Mainland China
If in South Korea and Japan bioethics discussion was only partly orchestrated from above, punctuated periodically with civics group initiatives, in Mainland China the discussion was developed in a predominantly one-sided manner: citizens' voices have not been heard in official discourse. In China, it is the scientists themselves who have been the main initiators in setting up IRBs, and who have personally facilitated or put efforts into the creation of written bioethics guidelines. But, when we consider stem cell scientists as a social group, with a few exceptions, they have not been in favour of public debate on hESR.
Governments of countries involved in hESR have paid attention to bioethical research regulation and the demarcation between acceptable and non-acceptable science. This also is the case in the People's Republic of China (PRC), where official ethics guidelines were created in 2002 and where the Ministry of Health (MoH) published formal guidelines for hESR in 2003 (Doering, 2003; Ministry of Health, 2003) . Although the guidelines did not take the form of legislation, they did carry political authority. But scientists, in particular those who had returned from training abroad, were dedicated to setting up IRBs in their hospitals and laboratories, even at cost of conflict with colleagues (interviews with Xi in Wuhan; Guang in Changsha; Deng in Xuanwu hospital, Xue in the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences; Wang in Beijing University). In interviews, PIs expressed strong motivation to establish guidelines, as they regarded them as a condition for functioning internationally and for preventing clashes with patients, a problem receiving much attention from both medical professionals and the Chinese media (Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2010a) .
However, in China, a country in which political grass-root organizations are prohibited and where NGOs, subject to official scrutiny, have only recently become involved in these matters (Fleming, 2009) , views of ordinary citizens have not been sought in the hESR debate. Meanwhile, newspaper articles mention that the status of the embryo in China is uncontroversial, due to the country's Confucian tradition (Mann, 2003) . Until the promulgation of new regulations in 2003, stem cell researchers were not obstructed in their work on embryos by a shortage of bioresources or by a critical public. However, scientists and humanities scholars engaged with bioethics, and heated discussions on the bioethics of reproductive and therapeutic cloning or hESR did take place among medical and life science professionals and philosophers. The effects of these discussions are evidenced in the evolution of textbooks on medical ethics. An increasing number of medical universities in large cities offer a course in medical ethics, where students are expected to be aware of their contents (Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2008a) .
Apart from providing moral guidance to future physicians and researchers, medical ethics textbooks also serve to develop a new and important field of knowledge, and to define it in the terms of currently dominant discourses -varying from socialism and liberalism to Confucianism and nationalist expansionism. A brief examination of 17 textbooks shows that from 2002 onwards an increasing number of pages is dedicated to hESR, often formulated in terms of 'for and against'. Identified problems with hESR mainly cluster around two issues: the value of the embryo and embryo donation. In most cases (14 out of 17) problems in embryo research are discussed as mainly pertaining to foreign societies. But one textbook (Qiu et al., 2003) refers to issues of whether the treatment of the embryo in hESR can be regarded as benevolent [ren] , and it weighs the violation of value attached to the embryo, seen as a moral individual [daode geren], against the unethical stance of not helping the severely disabled. Another textbook (Lu et al., 1999: 190) questions whether one can prevent cloning technologies meant for therapeutic cloning from being used for human reproductive cloning, and whether safety can be guaranteed even in the case of therapeutic cloning. Only one textbook (Sun, 2004) relates the discussion on the value of human life to a specifically Chinese context, including Confucianism, referred to as an a-religious form of regarding human life as sacred [Tiandi zhi xing, ren wei gui]. For instance, it states that, even today, donating the organs of the deceased is regarded as wrong, as families want the deceased to enter heaven [Tianguo] intact (Sun et al., 2004: 116) . However, as embryos and fetuses are formally not regarded as social human beings, but as biological human beings, spare embryos after IVF treatment or fetuses aborted as a requirement of the family planning policy can be used for research (Sun et al., 2004: 116) .
Half of the textbooks associate issues of mental or financial pressures on women to donate embryos or oocytes, benefit sharing, the psychological problems related to abortion, attachment to pre-birth life, and embryo trade as if they are problems belonging to foreign, Western, feminist or Christian worlds. 3 This is not surprising, as the acknowledgement of some of these problems in China would amount to querying official policies on birth planning. Nevertheless, discussing these issues in the textbooks makes them relevant to the work of physicians and students, also in a Chinese political or social context. In fact, it may partly explain why scientists shy away from calling for public debate on hESR. When asked about the need for public discussion on the donation of embryos and oocytes, more than 90 percent of stem cell scientists interviewed (37 of 42) said that China would be ill advised to start such a debate. The various reasons scientists provided for this can be summarized as follows:
• As China is an atheist country, it does not have any religious notion of a sacred embryo, and thus there is no need for public discussion.
• Superstitious people in rural areas, influenced by Taoist and Confucian notions of blood, semen, organs, bone marrow and other bodily tissues as precious substances, would veto donation in public discussion, so it is better not to have public debate.
• Due to a lack of education, the people are not fit to participate in public debate about something complex and scientific. They need to be qualified first.
• In rural regions where women are discriminated against, they could be pressured into donating embryos or oocytes for money.
• Due to their material interests, people could not be expected to dedicate time to participating in public discussions on embryo or oocyte donation.
In short, the majority of interviewed stem cell scientists oppose public engagement in hESR, albeit for divergent reasons. Most of the Chinese scientists that the first author interviewed do not show much faith in the current communications between scientists, regulators and bioethicists, and do not trust the public to discuss science in a way that would benefit them, as is the case among Japanese scientists. Although partly due to their lack of trust in the Chinese media to represent the debate 'fairly', the Chinese scientists did not favour engaging in public debate due to their lack of trust in the reasonableness of the public. But it is especially the bioethicists about whom the majority of scientists complained, in particular because bioethicists' power has grown since the establishment of China's National Bioethics Association in 2008. Even though scientists acknowledge the need to maintain good relations with them, some leading scientists believe that the inability of bioethicists to tailor regulations relevant to China's situation jeopardizes China's prospects of forging ahead in the field of hESR, while others do not believe that bioethicists are able to hold debate without taking a political stance. Nevertheless, most scientists in well-funded laboratories claim that international guidelines are crucial to China's hESR. At stake are not so much the core international guidelines for hESR, such as those of the ISSCR, but the level and manner of their implementation and supervision within China. In fact, these scientists claim to welcome international involvement in the form of collaborations and reviews. But just how to interpret and implement international guidelines is sorely contested, and some scientists and politicians do not regard public engagement as helpful, let alone as a sociopolitical step forward.
Taiwan
Taiwan's public engagement in hESR differs from that of the other three countries. Unlike South Korean scientists, Taiwanese scientists have refrained from speaking openly in favour of hESR and, though they have established human embryonic stem cell lines, they have kept a safe distance from therapeutic cloning. Unlike scientists in Japan, Taiwanese scientists do not believe in their ability to persuade the public of the merits of regulation conducive to the development of hESR; and, unlike scientists in Mainland China, Taiwan's scientists place importance on public discussion, but are generally keen not to clash with civic players over bioethics regulation.
In Taiwan, various scandals related to confidentiality in human genetic biobanking, informed consent in blood sampling, privacy in informed consent cards and beneficence in human subject research have led to a general atmosphere of distrust between scientists and the public regarding the ethics of biomedical research. An illustration of this mood is a press release by the Consumers' Foundation of Taiwan in 2005 that warned that 'patients have no obligation to act like "mice in the lab" for physicians and researchers' (Tai and Chiou, 2008: 109) . This press release argued for installing a local process of public deliberation over human genetic biobanking, in which predictably vulnerable social groups hold their own deliberations. Experts are needed, the press release argued, because the lay public cannot be expected to be aware of the potential profits made through patenting and the benefits of controlling bio-resources by researchers through exchanges of biomaterials and collaborations.
Although similar issues are at stake in the case of hESR, stem cell researchers in Taiwan have largely succeeded in maintaining a low profile, and have avoided becoming targets of criticism in the public media. Although public consultation, for the most part, has taken place in a top-down manner, it differs fundamentally from that in Mainland China, as it is framed in terms of human rights and democracy, which are regarded among humanities scholars and a large part of the public as precious goods attained through struggle in the 1980s.
Debate over hESR in Taiwan was initiated when stem cell scientists and regulators realized that without bioethics regulation hESR could become subject to criticism. In 2002, the Department of Health (DoH) organized a debate committee with two public hearings, one in Taipei and one in Gaoxiong. At these hearings, only scientific and medical experts, and representatives of religious groups (ethicists, doctors, legal experts, scientists, IVF clinicians, Christians, Buddhists) were present, with no patients or 'common' people participating. Even though the committee included individuals who opposed hESR (a Catholic, a Buddhist and the Vice-Minister of the DoH, also a Catholic), the officials from the DoH were reluctant to impose strict regulations. Even though the notion of a 'public hearing' in fact meant a meeting for experts, it was argued that it should precede public opinion polls.
The resultant support for relatively permissive regulation was closely related to economic motives as well as wider scientific ambitions in the early 2000s, when biosciences and biotechnology were declared as a strategic area for the restructuring of Taiwan's economy. The 2002 guidelines allowed the use of surplus embryos for hESR, if no longer needed for reproduction (Wong, 2007: 161-2) . It was a minimal regulation that stressed scientific autonomy and refrained not only from developing hard legal instruments but also from a specification of more sensitive issues such as the creation of human embryos for research, a matter on which no consensus was reached.
As the creation of human embryos for research purposes was not allowed, no regulation could be issued for SCNT, or therapeutic cloning. To give the idea of regulation more substance, a team of three, comprising a legal scholar, a bioethicist and a legislator, formulated new regulations and made an official appeal to change the previous regulations, but the appeal was rejected; the government decided that more discussion was needed before taking decisive action. But the DoH was hesitant. In 2003, it mandated that Professor Lee Shui-Chuen from Zhong-Yang University would conduct an opinion poll of the general public. It soon became clear that the public was not against hESR, but showed little awareness of and interest in the issues related to it. This was confirmed by the few comments on hESR recorded on the website of the Ministry of Health in 2005−2006, compared with comments on other issues, such as brain death.
However, the prolonged absence of regulation for therapeutic cloning meant that scientists could not go ahead with their research into SCNT. According to Paragraph 25 of the law for cell therapy (Department of Health, 2007) , which stipulates that therapy practice should not violate medical ethics, therapeutic cloning would be unethical, as it presumes the creation of embryos for research. This situation made SCNT an ambiguous technique: it was not prohibited, but 'medical ethics' did not regard it as ethical. Under these circumstances, scientists could not get relevant funding. Although scientists expressed their dissatisfaction, engaging in SCNT was out of the question after the 2005 'Hwang scandal'. Under pressure from scientists, an inter-ministerial 'stem cell task force' was set up under the Executive Yuan to bring about a fundamental restructuring of the regulations, and again the discussion remained mainly open to experts, although the survey does represent an attempt to apprehend public sentiment. Nevertheless, provisional regulation was made in 2006 to support research until more robust regulations had passed parliamentary vote.
On (Department of Health, 2007) . These draft guidelines expressly allow SCNT and permit the use and destruction of human embryos for research purposes. In addition, new national legislation, the Human Embryo and Embryonic Stem Cell Research Act, was approved in the Executive Yuan on 24 July 2008 (Department of Health, 2007) . It was emphasized that the new guidelines called for special scrutiny of hESR with rigorous ethical standards, and that 'adherence to international standard will ensure a role of Taiwanese stem cell researchers in international collaborations' (Taiwan Society for Stem Cell Research, 2011). It also committed to sponsor the establishment of Taiwan Stem Cell Bank, believed to be another critical catalyst for international collaborations. Nevertheless, the draft law has remained in the Legislative Yuan. When Chiu Ing-Ming (Qiu Yingming), distinguished research fellow and director of the National Institute of Health Stem Cell Research Centre, declared that 'We allowed SCNT', most scientists argued that permission had come years too late and still had no robust legal basis (interview Chang, 13 May 2010). And indeed, an informal survey among 32 stem cell researchers at a national laboratory, conducted by Jennifer Liu in 2007, indicated that 69 percent stated that egg or embryo procurement was the major issue facing hESR in Taiwan (Liu, 2011) .
Nevertheless, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University (NTU) stem cell experts have discussed the possibility of initiating a project. But getting a research protocol through a local IRB is no easy matter, as the creation and destruction of embryos is still controversial. Furthermore, researchers face difficulties when obtaining embryos, and are aware that they have not managed to gain the trust of the public (Liu, 2011) . Although the general public do not know what to think about SCNT, legal, scientific and ethics experts on IRBs realize that it is a potentially controversial and politically sensitive subject. The Roman Catholic/Buddhist parties, in principle, want to avoid the destruction of embryos. And the Buddhist representative, Shih Chao-Hui (She Shaohui), only wants to allow SCNT in exceptional cases (Hongshe Bimonthly, n.d.) . Not all Christians oppose embryo research. For instances, Chang Nan-chi, an evangelical scientist, proclaimed that SCNT was given to scientists by God to cure disease. But awareness that a full discussion in Taiwan has not been held has led to insecurity among scientists about societal backing.
According to some humanities scholars and human rights activists, scientists are afraid that public discussion of their research will lead to problems (interviews with T Wang, 8 May 2010; S Wang, 11 May 2010; Chang, 13 May 2010). But many stem cell researchers and regulators regard human rights activists as stumbling blocks to scientific research (interview, S Wang). Even scholars who are neither scientists nor activists say that the scientists do not engage with society and only want regulation that protects their scientific ventures (interviews S Wang, Lee and Wang). For instance, a social science scholar, Professor Wang, claimed that in Taiwan the guidelines for embryo donation in IVF clinics do not sufficiently separate the roles of IVF doctors and stem cell researcher, which means that patients are not protected against undue pressure from their doctors (Wang, 8 May 2010) . Human rights activists say they do not trust scientists. For example, one activist expressed the view that: 'as they [scientists] only need IRB permission, they have the power to make their own arrangements with the IRB' (Chang, 13 May 2010). This situation contrasts with that in Japan, where external permission from a national ethics committee is required. It is clear, however, that scientists try to avoid external oversight, as they know from their colleagues in Japan that this can slow down research considerably (S Wang, 11 May 2010). Nevertheless, lengthy procedures become unavoidable once the research moves to clinical applications -in general, though, this would be of little concern to the scientists who focus on 'basic research'. In the meantime, however, a crossministerial task force has been set up to deliberate on the funding problems. John Yu (You Zhengbo), director of the Institute of Cellular and Organismic Biology, Academia Sinica, expressed the view that funding now has to be used most effectively, and decided to invest it in pilot projects in other fields, such as somatic stem cell and iPS research (Chang interview, 13 May 2010; Jisui Sunshang Jiankang Wang, 2010) .
In brief, the Taiwan case shows how civic group opposition has made scientists nervous about public debate on hESR. Scientists do not encourage debate, arguing that most Taiwanese subjects do not show interest in it, whereas the voices of civic groups have become increasingly loud in the media. In Japan, where a similarly jittery atmosphere around the media prevails, scientists express a belief in the reasonable nature of citizens; a belief that is conducive to looser regulations based on mutual trust. In Taiwan, media anxiety led politicians and scientists to limit hESR debate mainly to experts. This, in turn, complicated the regulation of SCNT. Unlike the situation in Mainland China, however, the continued absence of regulation in Taiwan meant that scientists could not go ahead with SCNT, because of the impossibility of gaining state funding, together with the possibility of attracting public scrutiny. The slow pace of legislation of hESR augments the frustration of scientists by making clear to them that Taiwan has not prioritized hESR, unlike South Korea and Mainland China.
Modes of public consultation in a global context: An overview
As shown above, the field of hESR, including its bioethics regulation, was predefined and regulated first in Western high-income societies before coming to Asia. But its embedding in local communities took place in multiple ways -or included the consultation of different publics (see Table 1 ) -and was incentivized by diverse driving forces. The table shows that East Asian countries have encouraged public discussion to varying degrees when developing bioethical regulation of hESR.
Diverse forms of public participation in debates take place in East Asian countries, also within different forums: Internet discussions, discussions in medical textbooks, discussions among science experts. All four countries include bioethicists to some degree, while science cafes, focus group discussions, debate in the media, organised public discussions and debates among 'the people' (rather than just among experts) are concentrated in Japan, and to a lesser extent in South Korea and Taiwan.
Ultimately, it is hard to say whether East Asian decision-making about hESR regulation is autocratic or democratic. Even in the PRC, where we expected restraints on public deliberation, discussions take place among intellectuals, regulators and scientists at conferences, on the web, in classrooms and laboratories, in textbooks and to a lesser extent in the press. More important questions are whether and how discussions are held and shape decision-making, how political mechanisms articulate these as guidelines, and whether or not these guidelines are enforced. PRC governance has a tradition of basing policies upon the views of intellectuals (Greenhalgh, 2007; Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2007) by organizing committees and consulting think tanks populated by Party officials and academics. Policies are also based on data acquired by tapping views prevalent in society, including those found on the Internet, in textbooks and in the media. Although in this case national debate was not encouraged, knowledge about 'the people' is regarded as expedient for political strategy and governance (see Zhang, 2011) .
It is difficult to gauge the democratic contents of a debate, partly due to differences in prevailing modes of consultation. Thus, when debates deploy a vocabulary of civil society, human rights and democracy, such as in Taiwan or South Korea, the discourse may give the impression of public participation, while in a country where debates are organized in terms of 'informed discussion', 'science cafés' and the 'genomics square', such as in Japan, one can get the impression of a one-sided relation of scientists informing the public. But, in fact, the Japanese government has put much effort into stimulating discussion. And even though discussion around hESR in Japan never lit up in a way that compares with discussions around other topics, such as euthanasia and brain death, minority voices have made more of a political and regulatory imprint than in the other three countries.
The driving forces behind creating bioethics regulation and public discussion differ starkly among the four countries. Scientists in China had taken their own initiative in setting up IRBs, initially to continue international collaborations and later to receive state funding. But, on the whole, they did not favour public discussion, partly because they feared the 'unreasonable' views of bioethicists and laypeople. In Japan, on the contrary, even though the minority voices in public discussions with scientists were picked up by committee members, and were reflected in the strict guidelines developed for hESR, stem cell scientists strongly supported public discussion, believing that 'ordinary' citizens would help their case for loosening regulation. Eventually, when discussions on iPS flared up, the scientists did, indeed, receive support from the public, and also for their hESR efforts. To many members of the public, the idea was unacceptable that American scientists would 'beat' Japan due to their regulatory advantages in a field that had been marked as Japanese. In Taiwan, hESR, and specifically SCNT, was not discussed in a popular and political forum, as was, for instance, biobanking. Although discussions have been held on the topic, and controversies led to strong tensions between activists and scientists, it did not receive enough political priority for developing regulations, and therefore the field stagnated. In Japan, and more recently in Taiwan and South Korea, the absence of regulation in a controversial field meant that research could not go ahead. As successful research depends on the reputation of funding agencies, hospitals and scientists, any media furore can have disastrous consequences for careers, enterprises and networks.
Discussion: Public inclusion?
Discussion of public participation in science policy has concentrated on how to include publics in a fair manner, without unnecessarily obstructing innovation. The increasing standardization and professionalization of bioethics has implications for public involvement in debate on hESR in different political cultures, and raises questions about what 'democratization' and 'public participation' mean.
Kinds of public
Political systems of decision-making set the scene and influence discussion about hESR and its uptake. But what if the reason for adopting regulation is externally induced and does not enjoy national priority? In China, bioethics procedures initially were adopted mainly to gain international recognition. Without following local political and participatory norms, this has had consequences for the acceptance of such procedures at home, and for international trust in their implementation. Other countries, such as Japan, have shaped their bioethics standards in a way that agrees with domestic public views: the Japanese government invited the public to participate in discussions, and emphasized minority views of civilian groups in its regulations. But the sensitive nature of the regulations led the civil bureaucracy to protracted deliberation about details, causing delays.
The role of social movements in public consultation is controversial. Thus, a recent study by Evans and Plows (2007) suggests that social activists should be counted as experts, separating their views from the public discussion. Evans and Plows distinguish between debates involving expert knowledges, both of scientists and social movement actors, and debates involving the views of non-expert citizens. They argue that inclusion of the 'disinterested views of non-expert citizens' is needed 'to improve the scrutiny and accountability of science within representative democracies' (Evans and Plows, 2007: 827) . Accordingly, they view campaigners, members of NGOs, feminists, members of social movements and other activists as lay-experts, who participate along with the 'core group of contributory scientists'. For this reason, these lay-experts can no longer claim to represent 'citizens in general' (Evans and Plows, 2007: 827) . But as shown in the case of Mainland China, scientists can take advantage of the fact that 'disinterested citizens' have little understanding of the political implications of a certain stance, so that debate may underexpose critical voices. Similarly, the Japanese 'core group of contributory scientists' strongly supported holding public debate with lay people, but had an aversion to engaging with particular critical minority voices. By mobilizing the 'general' public, they had hoped that less strict regulations would result. In fact, most scientists were in favour of listening to patient groups that supported hESR, but not to 'radical' feminist/ disability movement actors. Any inclusion of the 'disinterested public' would involve some form of pre-framing of the consultation agenda (Irwin, 2001: 15) to get them involved in the debate in the first place. If activists were to be classified separately as experts, 'public debate' could effectively diminish the role that social movement 'experts' have played thus far.
Common good
STS scholarship on the politics of expertise has paid more attention to questions about the institutionalization of democratic procedures, human rights and 'bottom-up-ness', than to the material and political dimensions of hESR practice, such as research funding, regulation, infrastructure and sourcing, and how they affect the people and institutions in their political constituency. And in political discourse, the drive for scientific progress and competition in the life sciences has gained more attention than the practical issues of how funding, regulation and material sourcing can best contribute to what people regard as a 'common good', such as taking care of the sick and elderly. A particular region or political constituency may want to support hESR only when it is underpinned by accepted policies on public health and life values. Thus, it is difficult to defend hESR in a country that usurps large amounts of government investment and utilizes bodily material donated by volunteers, when the research is not aimed at a commonly recognized good, such as curing the country's patients through generally accessible healthcare practices. The concept of 'common good' applied here is based on an elaboration of Aristotelian concepts of politics by Gerard de Vries (2007) . What has been lacking thus far in discussions about the ethics of scientific research is not so much attention to the political negotiation of authority and legitimacy of bioethics procedures in general, but rather attention to what he calls the 'object' of research: the driving force behind research as a practice serving a common good (de Vries, 2007) . Explaining the term 'research object' involves reflection on the political role of scientists, or their involvement with the 'common good'. Rather than asking who should be involved in debates underlying science decision-making, de Vries shifts the question to what it means for scientists and concerned others to be politically involved. According to de Vries, experts engage in politics when they try to translate a wide range of conflicting views and interests into a 'common good' served by their research. Such a 'research object' would involve setting up a constitution, including an organizational structure, institutions, rules and provisions, for a practice in which the 'object' could circulate. Thus, if in the study of hESR we regard finding a cure for severe and disabling diseases through regenerative medicine as a common good, then we find that not all stem cell scientists are engaged in politics in the sense of serving a 'common good'. Instead, some are more interested in career making, making a profit or establishing a business network. In such cases, 'finding a cure' as a research object does not gain shared currency. As de Vries argues, 'To be in or out of politics is not a matter of the opinions that are aired, but depends on whether an actor is involved in a praxis that aims at a political object, or not ' (pp. 794-5) .
The definition of research object as political involvement serving a 'common good' raises questions about the object of hESR in light of the globalization of both bioethics debate and the life sciences. It is questionable whether all scientists are prepared to engage in modes of research governance aimed at circulating cures in the constituency that supports the research financially and materially. Furthermore, boundaries of the constituency in which scientific research takes place are hard to draw. It requires us to examine whether experts use local resources to provide 'finding a cure' as a global 'common good' and how such a good would circulate among those it is meant for. And finally, intention, means and motivation are needed to translate the benefits of a global 'common good' into the practice of the political constituency researchers are part of. These issues may help us to determine the role that experts and the public should play in debate on bioethics.
Standardization of bioethics and professionalization
We find that the extent to which experts around the world engage with the 'common good' varies greatly. Instead of shaping bioethics reflectively in light of this variety, solutions have been sought in the direction of the global standardization of bioethics. Even when official guidelines in countries conform to standards used by the international science community, such as those supported by the ISSCR, standards concerning informed consent and the moral status of the embryo may be of little interest to experts and the general public. This may mean that the implementation of such standards becomes unreliable, relevant concerns get missed and the opportunity to engage society in discussion is lost. To counteract such reactions, countries have concentrated on strengthening capacity-building in bioethics and setting up ethics committees led by professionals. But standardization and professionalization may lead to problematic scenarios where a corresponding 'object' of research is lacking or takes the place of public involvement.
Standardization, which often is manifest in the institutionalization and professionalization of bioethics, may in fact discourage debates on whether to support hESR, on who should benefit from the fruits of hESR, on how this will happen, and at what cost and for whom. Although these questions are integral to the politics of developing a 'common good' for circulation in a political constituency, when no such object can be identified, the practice of hESR becomes an activity pursued by other interests. In such cases, standardization and professionalization of bioethics become buffers against external critique and debate, protecting standards that bear no relation to the object of hESR. For instance, why should embryos or oocytes be donated to for-profit therapies practiced on an experimental basis when no return conducive to the 'common good' can be expected?
In both Japan and South Korea, although religious, patient and feminist groups have been active participants in public debate on hESR, problems related to the amount of time, effort and money spent on organizing meetings, maintaining websites and consulting for a sustained engagement in debates have become problematic. With the increase in state investments in training capacity, the increase of bioethics expertise among professionals and the bureaucratization of guidelines, 'lay experts' have found it difficult to cope with the demands placed upon them, as a result of which one of the main groups engaged in public debate in Japan, the Anti-Eugenics Thought Network, disappeared in 2007. The professionalization of bioethics increasingly means that, apart from the time, effort and funding for activities, activists require legal, scientific and interactional skills to function.
Conclusion
East Asian societies make use of various forms of consultation when formulating policies on hESR regulation, including public discussion, social activism, science cafes, academic debate and internet discussion. Both autocratic and democratic governments may be interested in what citizens have to say. Communication among scientists, regulators, governments, social movements and the disinterested public may take various shapes, only partly depending on the political and participatory mechanisms in place. But these need to be understood together with transnational pressures and local histories.
Of greatly varying importance to the development of bioethics in the countries studied was the alien provenance of bioethics regulation. In the case of Mainland China, it was most clear that scientists had to initiate institutional review to satisfy the international stem cell community. The crucial role of the international stem cell community was less clear in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, and least relevant for Japan. In Japan, minority voices with close concerns about hESR and SCNT were taken seriously, which had radical consequences for the development of stem cell research. In Taiwan, as regulation for SCNT was stalled, the practice had little chance to develop. In China, where the development of hESR and SCNT received little regulatory constraint, laypeople were hardly involved in public discussion. But China and, after the Hwang scandal, South Korea have had problems in gaining the trust of the international science community -a lack of trust that has been partly related to a lack of confidence in the implementation of ethical review procedures.
The identification of the research object, its constituency, and the intentions and means available for translating it into a widely circulating praxis may be crucial to a successful application for the 'common good'. In fact, where there is no clear research object associated with hESR, bioethics institutions may cover up social and political problems. In the translation of a wide range of conflicting views and interests into a 'common good', public discussion is crucial to the shaping of a constitution in which stem cell research circulates or, if unacceptable, is put aside. Consultation may actually be more effective when those engaged with the material and political aspects of hESR are encouraged to develop their views and are given serious consideration, rather than by creating a 'democratic' system to poll all representative views. Japan's initial low-key debate on hESR in fact seems to have been closest to this mode of decision-making. A concern exists, however, that due to the standardisation of bioethics and its professionalization, the finances, time and expertise demanded of social activism in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan will weaken civil participation. The fate of research objects may depend on their role.
Notes
1. Most of the interviews were conducted in the relevant local languages, though some interviews with scientists who had received their higher education in English-speaking countries were conducted in English. Where identifying information is used, it has been taken from publicly available sources. In most cases, however, we have used pseudonyms, even when scientists gave permission for their names to be used. In one case, we decided not to use the data, as the interviewee in question worried about issues of representation and reputation. The research upon which this study is based has received ethics approval from the Universities of Sussex and Cambridge. 2. The three ministries that issued the guidelines were the Ministry of Education, Sports, Science and Technology, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 3. But, as shown by Jing-Bao Nie (2005) , a large proportion of the Chinese population regards life as beginning at conception.
